Private attorneys representing government entities are entitled to assert qualified immunity as a defense to civil rights claims, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled on Tuesday in Filarsky v. Delia.  The Court’s decision allows private attorneys to rely on the same protections that their public counterparts use.


The decision reverses a ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that held a private attorney could not rely on qualified immunity.

The City of Rialto, California hired a private attorney to conduct an internal affairs investigation of a firefighter taking sick leave after cleaning up a toxic spill. The firefighter’s superiors suspected that he was not ill because he had been the subject of disciplinary action immediately prior to the spill.

The firefighter claimed that he was forced to allow a warrantless inspection of his home as part of the investigation.  He sued both the City and the attorney who conducted the investigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his civil rights. 

Section 1983 is the enforcement arm of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees equal protection of rights under federal and state laws, and establishes a cause of action against persons who violate constitutional rights under color of state law.

Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. cited historical examples of the protections available to persons who worked for the government when Congress passed the statute in 1871.  He concluded that the protections provide did not vary depending on whether the person worked full time or part time for the government.

“The government’s need to attract talented individuals is not limited to full-time public employees,” the Chief Justice wrote.  “Indeed, it is often when there is a particular need for specialized knowledge or expertise that the government must look outside its permanent workforce to secure the services of private individuals.”

The Court noted that the private lawyer had specialized experience in conducting internal affairs investigations, and that the City had no permanent employees with comparable qualifications. 
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The National Hockey League playoffs are underway, and the League is experiencing unprecedented media coverage as a result of the $2 billion dollar contract it signed with NBC last spring.  But with newfound popularity, comes newfound criticism, and the tensions of playoff hockey have only exacerbated the onslaught from both players and pundits.  Most of the commentary has centered on a perceived lack of consistency in officiating and enforcement, and of course, at the center of all of this is the League's concussion problem.  Last week, the League office drew heat after Nashville Predator's Defenseman Shea Weber was not suspended for deliberately slamming the head of Detroit Red Wings Forward Henrik Zetterberg into the glass.  Perhaps heeding these criticisms, the League responded this weekend with a three-game suspension for Carl Hagelin of the New York Rangers, after he elbowed the Ottawa Senators' Daniel Alfredson, causing a concussion.  Some commended the NHL for taking a tougher stance with the Hagelin suspension, but the repercussions handed down have been widely inconsistent.  Given that the League has been beset by concussion concerns with its biggest stars such as Sidney Crosby, and in light of the brewing litigation against the NFL by its former players, the NHL would do well to establish a consistent and strict policy with respect to blows to the head.

Meanwhile in the NFL, yet another concussion related lawsuit was filed Monday on behalf of four former players in Atlanta.  What makes this suit distinct from the 58 suits that have already been filed, however, is that this complaint is the first to make specific reference to "bounty-gate."  The lawsuit references the scandal as just another example of the League's indolence in dealing with the realities of head trauma. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the NFL "explicitly relied on violence" and neglected to educate players on the dangers of concussions.

Linking the bounty scandal to the ongoing concussion litigation was inevitable, but it is unlikely to be a game changer from a legal standpoint. From a public relations perspective, allegations related to bounties certainly creates a buzz, but ultimately, the scandal will offer little in the way of proving the League's negligence. First, there is little proof, at least at this point, that the League was aware of bounties occurring, and even less evidence suggesting that the problem is pervasive.  Additionally, unless the individual plaintiffs claim to have been directly affected by the scheme, the causal link is missing.  In fact, the four plaintiffs in this new suit merely state that the bounty system is indicative of a culture of violence.  But professional football is inherently violent, and without a showing that the League's policy in regards to bounty systems rendered the sport unreasonably dangerous, the allegations referencing the bounty system will do little more than draw more attention to the issue.  Regardless of the potency of these allegations, look for more suits to be filed, and expect those complaints to mirror this one.

Thank you to Brian Konkel, Law Clerk at SmithAmundsen for his work on this piece.
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Supreme Court Hears Glaxo Overtime Pay Case

Posted on April 17, 2012 05:54 by Scott Gibson

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument Monday on the hotly questioned issue of whether pharmaceutical sales representatives are subject to the outside sales exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  

The case, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, Corp., challenges the Ninth Circuit’s decision that sales representatives were subject to the outside sales exemption of the FLSA.  That decision conflicts with a prior decision of the Second Circuit holding that pharmaceutical sales reps are entitled to overtime compensation.

The reps – and the Department of Labor – argue that they are not subject to the exemption because they do not interact with the patients and hospitals that ultimately purchase the medications from wholesalers.  Rather, they promote medications to physicians, who write prescriptions for their patients.
The case impacts employment conditions of tens of thousands of sales representatives, and could give rise to astronomical claims for unpaid overtime compensative.  In January, for example, Novartis agreed to pay $99 million to settle a similar case after receiving an adverse ruling on appeal.
As important as the overtime issue is, the case raises a second issue that could prove to be more wide reaching in its effect, specifically, the deference owed to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of regulations.

The Supreme Court should issue its decision in June.
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A growing trend among employers is requesting applicants’ usernames and passwords to gain access to restricted social media in order to investigate applicants during the hiring process.  In response to this trend, Illinois and Maryland have each recently proposed laws that would essentially ban employers from requesting this type of information.  The main arguments for and against the proposed laws are centered around constitutional privacy concerns, however,  employers should consider that restricting their hiring personnel’s access to this type of information is not as harmful as some opponents have argued.

There are several federal statutes that prohibit employers from considering age, color, race, religion, sex, national origin, disability, medical conditions/information, family history, etc. in making employment decisions.  These laws typically provide that employers may not even elicit such information during the hiring process and sometimes even after an offer of employment has been made.  Social media, like Facebook, is likely to contain some or even all of this information for any particular person.  

For example, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) protects persons age 40 and over from discrimination in the workplace.  In most instances, employers may not ask when the applicant was born, when they graduated high school, or any other questions likely to elicit a person’s age.  A person’s age, however,  is almost always listed prominently on their Facebook ‘info’ page. 

Also, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.   In most instances, employers are prohibited from considering any of these attributes during the hiring process.  Again, all these are usually readily apparent on any given person’s Facebook profile.  

If employers are openly asking for usernames and log-in information for various social media during the hiring process, they risk an employment discrimination claim by a rejected applicant.  There are many ways to judge an applicant’s ability to perform a job without resorting to these types of social media investigations.  The proposed laws, however restrictive on employers’ ability to deeply investigate its applicants, may save employers heartache down the road.  

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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") recently announced the adoption of a four-year strategic plan that focuses on, among other things, continued efforts to address "systemic discrimination" in the workplace.  

Not surprisingly, the EEOC's strategic plan sets forth a primary objective (which the EEOC acknowledges will exhaust the majority of its resources) to combat employment discrimination through administrative (e.g., investigation and conciliation) and litigation enforcement mechanisms with regard to private employers, labor organizations, employment agencies, and state and local government employers and through adjudicatory and oversight mechanisms Congress has given the EEOC with regard to federal employers.  

Based upon the EEOC's admittedly limited resources, the strategic plan states a need "to think strategically about how best to target its efforts to ensure the strongest and broadest impact possible in its efforts to stop unlawful employment discrimination."  In this regard, the strategic plan asserts that a top priority will be to continue the EEOC's 2006 "Systemic Initiative" designed to identify, investigate and litigate cases of alleged systemic discrimination (which the EEOC describes as "pattern or practice, policy, and/or class cases where the alleged discrimination [often by a single charging party] has a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic area").  

We look forward to gaining insight on how the EEOC intends to marshal its resources over the next several years - such as through the use of Commissioner charges, directed investigations, and empirical data - to address allegedly discriminatory policies or other instances of "systemic discrimination" from EEOC Commissioner Victoria A. Lipnic during DRI's 35th annual Employment & Labor Seminar, to be held May 2-4, 2012 in Chicago, IL.  If you have not already registered for this event, please access the registration information here and secure your spot today. 


 

 

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In a unanimous ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the “ministerial exception” developed in the lower courts and held that the First Amendment flatly prohibits the application of discrimination laws to the employment of “ministers” by religious institutions.  The Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., though fact-specific, affords broad discretion to churches and other religious entities to hire and fire employees engaged in preaching or teaching their faith, without fear of a discrimination suit.  

Writing the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts traced the origins of religious liberty reflected in the First Amendment—from Magna Carta to the founders’ (negative) experiences with established churches—and the Court’s traditionally hands-off approach to religious-governance disputes.  Rooted in this legal history and the constitutional text itself, which Chief Justice Roberts described as giving “special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,” the Court held that “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so,” violates both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.

The “ministerial exception” recognized by the Court is not limited to religious discrimination but includes all manner of otherwise-regulated distinctions among employees—e.g., sex, disability, marital status.  Moreover, in applying the exception in Hosanna-Tabor to preclude a teacher at a faith-based primary school from suing for retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Court held that the exception should not be limited to the “head of a religious congregation.”  The Court refused to “adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister” subject to the exception, but stressed that the plaintiff was a “commissioned minister,” and was held out by the school and herself as having that special vocation.  Although the plaintiff chiefly taught secular subjects and spent only part of her day teaching religion or leading students in prayer, the “ministerial exception” applied because her “job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.”  

Chief Justice Roberts closed by emphasizing that the Court’s adoption of the “ministerial exception” is limited to employment discrimination laws and that its application in Hosanna-Tabor was limited to the facts before the Court.  The Justices expressly reserved their views on whether or not the exception would or should apply to tortious acts, breach of contract, or other legal disputes involving religious employers and their employees.

Hosanna-Tabor offers significant leeway to faith-based employers in making employment decisions, and the defense bar would be wise to educate affected clients on their rights in this regard. That said, the fact-specific nature of the Court’s action warrants caution and a clear understanding of the requirements and duties of the job or jobs at issue, as well as the employer’s nature and purpose, before any such client should be advised to rely on the defense. 
       
James A. Sonne, Horvitz & Levy

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A 2011 Midlevel Associates Survey conducted by The American Lawyer demonstrates that although the salary gap between minority and majority associates is closing, persistent differences continue to exist.  Hispanic associates reported the highest increase in their salary from 2008 to 2011, while Asian associates reported the highest salary and billing rates as compared to both their minority and majority counterparts, despite a decrease in their average salary.  Nonetheless, minority associates continue to rate job satisfaction categories lower than their majority counterparts. 

The survey also demonstrates that firms are making an effort to retain their minority associates.  Black and Hispanic associates were the most likely to report that they had mentors – 86.5 % and 83.1%, respectively.  Notwithstanding, all minorities thought that they had a lower chance of making partner than white associates.  Only 60% of Blacks, 63.7% of Asians and 68.4% of Hispanics thought that they were headed toward promotion.  How effective are these mentoring relationships when minority associates do not believe that they will reach the upper echelons of their firms?  What is the missing link between mentoring and retention/advancement of minority associates?  Has your firm employed innovative efforts to address the issue of advancement of minority attorneys?

http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1322459168295&Survey_of_Minority_Associates_Shows_Persistent_Differences&cmp=tsm-cc-CCDDSurvey              

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The FTC Reins in Facebook

Posted on December 5, 2011 02:03 by Jim Fieweger

 

 

In the wild, wild west of the internet, it looks like the Federal Trade Commission is saddling up to play the role of sheriff. On November 29, 2011, the FTC announced its proposed settlement of claims against the social networking goliath, Facebook. (By the way, you can read about it on the Commission’s Facebook page. http://www.facebook.com/federaltradecommission?v=wall.) The settlement resolves an eight-count administrative complaint charging Facebook with misleading their users by telling them they would protect the privacy of personal information, but repeatedly allowing that information to be shared with third parties or made public without the users’ knowledge or consent.  (In the matter of Facebook, Inc., File no. 092 3188.) Coming on the heels of the FTC’s March 2011 settlement of charges that Google, Inc. violated its own privacy promises to consumers when it rolled out its social network site, Google Buzz (In the Matter of Google, Inc., File no. 102 3136), the Facebook case demonstrates the agency is willing to use consumer protection laws to “make sure companies live up to the privacy promises they make to American consumers.” http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm.)

The FTC’s charges stemmed from representations Facebook made to users regarding their ability to restrict access to personal information they loaded onto the site.  For example, according to the FTC, the company told users they could restrict access to personal data by using a “Friends Only” setting, but in fact, software applications developed by third parties -- “third-party apps” -- and employed by the users’ “Friends” could still access and collect the allegedly restricted data.  Facebook further misled users by telling them that third-party apps could not access data unnecessary to run the apps, and that Facebook would not share information with advertisers.  Neither of those representations was true.  Also, in December 2009, the company allegedly overrode users’ privacy settings when it enacted wholesale changes that public disclosed previously restricted information such as “Friends” lists, without first getting the users’ approval to enact these changes.  (You can read Facebook’s eight alleged deceptions  in the complaint at the FTC’s website - http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookcmpt.pdf.)

Under the proposed settlement, Facebook will be prohibited from making any further deceptive privacy claims, from changing the way it shares a user’s data without first obtaining the user’s approval, and from allowing anyone to access a user’s information more than 30 days after the user deletes his or her account.  In addition, Facebook will be required to maintain a comprehensive privacy program intended to address privacy concerns associated with both new and existing products used on its site.  To ensure the existence and proper administration of its privacy program, Facebook will be audited by an independent third party every two years for the next twenty years.  Though the settlement does not impose any monetary sanctions, Facebook could incur fines of up to $16,000 per day if it fails to comply with its terms.  The FTC will take public comments on the proposed settlement through December 30, 2011.  

The FTC’s charges focused on Facebook’s failure to live up to its own representations regarding data security, not the simple fact that it shared personal data with third parties. This tack derived from the consumer protection standards underlying the complaint -- specifically, section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” (15 U.S.C. §. 45(a)(1)).  (The FTC also is tasked with enforcing the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq., which imposes restrictions on operators of commercial websites who knowingly collect personal information from children under age 13, but that statute was not invoked in this case.)  
While it is easy to view this decision primarily as a vindication of personal privacy interests -- and in many ways, it is -- it really reflects a victory in the FTC’s efforts to defend consumer rights.  Facebook’s problems arose not from the dissemination of data, but from its failure to live up to its own promises.  Had Facebook not told its users that it would protect certain personal data, or had it simply informed users more fully regarding their December 2009 changes in their privacy practices, it is likely they could have disseminated the data precisely as they did, but avoided their run-in with the FTC.  

Facebook remains under criticism for other data collection practices, such as tracking webpages visited by both members and non-members.  As quoted in USA Today, West Virginia Senator Jay Rockefeller urges the passage of new laws to help consumers “protect their personal information from companies surreptitiously collecting and using . . . personal information for profit.” (http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-11-29/facebook-settles-with-ftc/51467448/1) Whether or not those new laws come to pass, the FTC has demonstrated that consumer protection laws already on the books give it some potent guns for policing the internet frontier.

Jim Fieweger is a partner in the Chicago law firm Williams, Montgomery & John.  A former Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern District of Illinois, Jim is an experienced trial lawyer whose practice focuses on commercial litigation and white collar criminal defense.  Jim is a member of the DRI Government Enforcement and Corporate Compliance Committee.

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With the federal and many state governments facing record deficits, legislatures and various governmental agencies have set their sights on the practice of Independent Contractor Misclassification as a way of adding billions of dollars to their revenues. It has been estimated that the misclassification of employees as independent contractors will cost the U.S. Treasury Department an estimated $7 billion in lost payroll tax revenue over the next 10 years. Recent audits by the California Employment Development Department (EDD) netted $140 million in additional tax revenues from companies that had misclassified 70,000 workers. Since 2009, multiple states have passed laws giving labor enforcement agencies more authority in auditing and penalizing companies that illegally classify employees as independent contractors. And although federal legislation aimed at enforcing improper classification has stalled in Congress, the 2011 federal budget appropriated $25 million to aid the Department of Labor in identifying and attacking employee misclassification. Similarly, the Internal Revenue Service is implementing a tax audit program that has also been fully funded in President Obama’s budget.

As if employers did not have enough motivation to take a second look at their use of independent contractors, plaintiff attorneys throughout the country have hastened the need for transportation companies to examine their employment practices with extensive class action litigation that has resulted in high stake verdicts and settlements in federal and state jurisdictions. While litigation was costly to the companies involved, it has also helped trucking and logistics companies identify employment and payment practices that contributed to findings that drivers were misclassified as independent contractors. Some of these practices have helped clear up the blurry line distinguishing employees from independent contractors. Among the policies that have led judges and juries to find that misclassification had occurred include:

- Drivers being required to adhere to company standards set forth in a guidebook
- Company advertising that it maintains its own fleet of vehicles
- Employers controlling the workload of the drivers and not allowing substitution of drivers
- Companies giving specific instructions to their drivers as to how to load, transport and unload shipments
- The practice of prohibiting drivers from using their own vehicles to provide services to other companies
- Internal employer evaluation of the performance of its drivers
- The requirement the drivers use certain routes on pick-ups and deliveries, drive trucks with the company logo and wear company uniforms

In short, companies that exercise control over the payment, routes, manner of delivery, and the ability of their drivers to work for other companies were deemed to be misclassifying employees as independent contractors. As a result, expensive settlements were reached to provide the drivers with lost workers' compensation, overtime, minimum wage, and other benefits. Ironically though, transportation companies have arguably benefited from the aggressive plaintiff litigation tactics since it has forced the industry to develop policies and procedures consistent with delegating control over duties to the drivers and preserving the independent contractor relationship. These practices include

- Allowing the independent contractors the freedom to accept or turn down loads with the exception that drivers need to be shut down when they are close to exceeding federal hours of service limits
- Avoiding the use of driver uniforms, universal driver policies and the common painting or logos on vehicles (especially in fleets with a combination of an employee and independent contractor drivers)
- Requiring drivers to maintain their own insurance, special permits and training records
- The updating and revision of owner-operator and lease agreements to make sure that the language reflects the intent of the parties to enter into an independent contractor relationship
- Making an independent contractor responsible for specific charges in vehicle lease agreements by correctly disclosing the charges pursuant to 49 CFR 376.12(h)

In sum, the transportation employers are faced with a difficult task of delegating control to drivers in an industry that certainly requires compliance with federal regulations. This inherent tension makes it wise for transportation employers to conduct mock audits as to the practices identified above. If an internal audit does reveal misclassification, employers do have options to remedy the situation:

1. Use the Safe Harbor provision of Section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code to provide an administrative settlement program, which is still more employer-friendly than many of the newer state laws.

2. Reclassify contractors who are clearly employees or, in the alternative, restructure the relationship via the use of an owner-operator agreement and the policy changes identified above. 

3. Consult with local labor and employment attorneys who can assist in the creation and the management of the audit and provide ongoing guidance about the evolving legal landscape and the likelihood of further changes in federal and state law in this area.


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Duty of Loyalty in the Employment Context


An employee owes a duty of loyalty to his company, and nevertheless decides to disclose internal company information to third parties. The individual knows this disclosure will cause economic harm to his company, but does it anyway. Can the individual’s actions be protected under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)? Under a recent decision by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), analogous statements were found protected under Section 7 of the NLRA and the employer was required to reinstate and pay damages to the disloyal employees.

The Facts in MasTec

The case was MasTec Advanced Tech., 357 NLRB No. 17 (7/21/11). A group of employees protested a new policy to their employer and were not satisfied with the employer’s response. The employees proceeded to get into their company vans, drive as a group to the local television station and accuse their employer on live television of instructing them to lie to the company’s customers. The employees were terminated for their statements. 

There was no dispute that the employees were engaged in concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA. “Concerted Activity” encompasses activity by two or more employees or activity by a single employee for or on behalf of other workers or even by one employee who is acting alone to initiate group activity, so long as the activity relates to terms and conditions of employment. Meyers Industries (II), 281 NLRB 882 (1986). The issue was whether the employees’ statements on live television lost protection under the NLRA because they were “maliciously untrue” or “disloyal.” To most readers, that answer seems obvious on its face. Not to the NLRB.

As to the first part, the NLRB found that malice could not be found because it could not be shown that the statements by the employees were made with knowledge of their falsity. “The mere fact that statements are false, misleading or inaccurate is insufficient to demonstrate that they are maliciously untrue.”

With respect to the disloyalty issue, the NLRB held that “while the technicians may have been aware that some consumers might cancel the Respondents’ services after listening to the newscast, there is no evidence that they intended to inflict such harm on the Respondents’ business.” In other words, it mattered not if the employees’ knew that their statements would cost the company business, so long as there is no direct evidence that this was the employees’ intent.

The National Labor Policy

Is the MasTec Decision Consistent with National Labor Policy?

There is ample NLRB precedent for the proposition that employee conduct, even if intended to initiate or support concerted activity, is not always protected by the NLRA. The means used by the employees have been held determinative on the issue of whether to extend the Act’s protection or not. 

Thus, in Canyon Ranch Inc., 321 NLRB 937 (1996), the NLRB refused to give the Act's protection to employee conduct that involved breaching the privacy of communications between management officials. Even though the employee had breached said privacy in order to distribute the information to other employees, and therefore initiate concerted conduct, the NLRB declined to “elevate [the employee’s] breach of that privacy to the realm of Section 7 protection.”

Similarly, in Uniform Rental Services, 161 NLRB 187 (1966), the Board declined to reinstate an employee who had entered a manager's private office and pilfered a letter concerning the union from the manager's desk, even though the employee had broadcast its contents to other employees in an effort to promote concerted action. Again, in NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the proposition that wrongfully obtaining information from company files is not protected under the Act, irrespective of the use that the employee intends to make with the information.

The rational in Canyon Ranch, Uniform Rental and Brookshire, supra is consistent with the policies and purposes of the NLRA. The Act was never intended to destroy or dilute the relationship of loyalty that must exist in the employment context. There is nothing wrong with requiring employees who decide to appeal to third parties for assistance in their disputes with their employers to do so in a manner which is not designed to harm the employer’s ability to remain in business. To hold, as the current NLRB does, that employees’ clear disloyal conduct is protected has dangerous implications for the employees’ own job security and unnecessarily dilutes the duty of loyalty which employees owe their employers.

Overly Broad Concept of NLRA Protection

Under MasTec, if employees publicly disparage an employer to untold numbers of people, causing direct harm to the employer, this is protected, so long as the statements are not malicious or “intended” to cause harm to the employer, even if such harm is easily foreseen and a near certainty to occur. This concept of “intent” is unrealistic. Extending Section 7 protection to those facts is short sighted. It harms both sides.

Making employers powerless to discipline employees who disclose internal information to third parties, knowing that such disclosure will likely result in economic harm to the employing entity, does not advance the purposes of the NLRA.

In MasTec, the NLRB ignored the concept of the duty of loyalty in the employment relationship. Its concept of what constitutes “intent” and how Section 7 rights should be applied reflects an ivory tower mentality typical of those whose experience has been limited to bureaucracy or academia.

Jerry Morales is a partner in the Phoenix office of Snell & Wilmer. His practice is concentrated in labor, employment and construction law. Representation in employment-related matters includes wrongful termination, employment discrimination, arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution proceedings. He has extensive experience in NLRB unfair labor practice trials, labor union elections, collective bargaining, labor law issues affecting the construction industry, the Hispanic labor force and cross border employment, wage and hour compliance, corporate policy development and administrative proceedings before state and federal regulatory agencies, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, U.S. Department of labor and National Labor Relations Board.

Joe Kroeger is an associate in the Tucson office of Snell & Wilmer. His practice is concentrated in labor and employment. He represents employers in a variety of areas, including employment discrimination and harassment, wrongful discharge, breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, non-competition/non-solicitation matters, alternative dispute resolution, arbitration agreements and a variety of other related areas.
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